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ARGUMENTS 
I. IT WAS TS1/ S DUTY TO SUPPLY HEATED 
AND CHILLED AIR TO ALLRED' S STORE, 
AND ALLRED HAS SHOWN BY AFFIDAVIT 
THAT IT DID NOT. 
TSl has attempted to confuse what is really a 
straight-forward issue. TSl' s duty under the lease agreement 
was to supply heated and chilled air "to the premises." (R. 250) 
The "premises" are defined in the lease agreement as the 850 
square feet of Allred's store. (R. 13, H (c)) TSl concedes that 
Allred installed the local delivery system to hook into TSl' s 
central delivery system. (P. 23, Appellee's Brief)1 The issue 
raised by Allred' s Affidavit was whether TSl had connected the 
"bay" where Allred's store was located with the central delivery 
system in the mall. (R. 237, 11 7) If it did not, Allred would 
not have gotten heated and chilled air, even if she had 
correctly hooked into the central delivery system. 
Certainly, it was Allred's duty to "adapt" to the 
mall's central delivery system. (P. 25, Appellee' s Brief) But 
that is not the question before the Court. This Court must 
determine if paragraph 7 of Allred' s Affidavit has successfully 
*TS1 tries to argue that Allred failed to make this alle-
gation in the court below. (P. 22, Appellee' s Brief) Allred made 
the allegation in paragraph 3 of her counterclaim. (R. 71) 
However, it was unnecessary for Allred to do so, since TSl later 
conceded the point in its reply memorandum. (R. 243, " [I]t is the 
Plaintiff s contention that the Defendant did connect her store to 
the HVAC system. " ) 
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controverted a necessary element of TSl' s recovery, that is, 
whether TS1 supplied heated and chilled air to Allred' s store. 
Allred said that it did not, and TSl is correct in urging the 
Court not to weigh the evidence. (P. 23, Appellee' s Brief) 
While it may seem "improbable" to TS1, Allred has raised a 
genuine issue as to a material fact precluding summary judgment 
in TSl' s favor. 
TSl is left with the same lame argument it made in the 
trial court: Since it was Allred' s duty to install a local 
delivery system, TSl has no obligation for supplying heated or 
chilled air to her premises. Contrary to what TSl seems to 
suggest (PP. 24-25), it was not Allred's duty to see that all 
the central delivery connections were made. All she was 
required to do was hook on to the central delivery system. It is 
for the trial court to decide if Allred properly did that. 
II. ALLRED DID NOT NEED TO FILE AN 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF HER 
COUNTERCLAIM BECAUSE TSl' S SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT MOTION WAS BASED ENTIRELY 
ON ARGUMENTS OF LAW. 
TSl' s third point reveals a fundamental misappre-
hension of the common law of Utah and her Rules of Civil 
Procedure. There are two parts to a summary judgment: first, 
no genuine issue as to any material fact; second, moving party 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. The only factual allegations made by TSl in 
-2-
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its second summary judgment motion were that Allred signed the 
lease agreement and the lease agreement was an integration. (RR. 
360, H 1; 361, H 4) Neither of these facts were disputed. All 
the rest of the "facts" stated by TSl were characterizations of 
provisions in the lease agreement (RR. 361-64) and were 
therefore arguments of law. 2 
TSl has confused its motion for summary judgment with 
what has become known as a "Celotex" motion for summary 
judgment, after Celotex Corporation v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 
106 S.Ct. 2548 (1986). In such a motion, the moving party 
challenges the factual assertions made by the non-moving party 
in its pleadings. Then, if the non-moving party carries the 
burden of proving those factual assertions at trial, it must 
respond with evidence of its own. 
But TSl did not challenge the factual assertions in 
Allred' s counterclaim. (RR. 360-64). In fact, its argument was 
premised on the truth of those allegations. It merely 
questioned whether as a legal matter Allred had plead facts 
sufficient to support a cause of action. Thus, it was not 
incumbent on Allred to put forward evidence of her own, but 
rather to argue the legal issues raised by TSl' s motion. 
2It goes without saying that contract interpretation raises 
questions of law. Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P. 2d 198, 200 (Utah 
1991). 
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TS1 questions the sufficiency of Allred' s allegations 
of "fraud in the inducement." Unfortunately for TS1, it did not 
|raise this question in the court below (RR. 365-71), so this 
I issue is not properly before the Court. 3 
TS1 cites only one Utah case in support of its 
'proposition that "parol evidence is not. .. admissible to prove 
1
 fraud. " F. M. A. Financial Corporation v. Hansen Dairy, Inc., 617 
I P. 2d 327 (Utah 1980) does not stand for this proposition. In 
jfact, it does not even mention "fraud." It does say that the 
parol evidence rule 
should not be applied with any such 
unreasoning rigidity as to defeat what may 
I be shown to be the actual purpose and intent 
of the parties, but should be applied in the 
1 light of reason to serve the ends of 
I justice. 
1
 617 P. 2d at 329. 
As for the other two claims in Allred' s counterclaim, 
TS1 has said nothing about the implied covenant of good faith 
Even it had, it is clear that only one of the required 
; elements is not plead: knowledge of the falsity of the repre-
jsentations. TS1 is wrong when it says there is no allegation of 
I reliance. (R. 71, 11 3) There is no requirement that Allred say 
jher reliance was "reasonable;" she alleged that she changed her 
position to her financial detriment and that is more than suffi-
| cient. See Mountain Fir Lumber Co. . Inc. v. Employee Benefits Ins. 
ICo. , 679 P. 2d 296, 300 (Or. 1984). TS1 better do its homework 
!when it says the claim is deficient for not stating "presently 
(existing facts." (P. 31, Appellee's Brief) The Utah Supreme Court 
jin Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P. 2d 766 (Utah 1985) laid this one to 
jrest and questioned the good faith of counsel who made the 
(argument. 705 P. 2d at 770 & n. 2. 
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I 
and fair dealing (Allred' s Second Claim for Relief) and has not 
attempted to challenge the express provisions in the lease 
agreement upon which Allred relies for support (Allred' s Third 
Claim for Relief). 
III. ALLRED' S JURY TRIAL DEMAND IS NOT 
MOOT. AND THERE WAS NO BASIS FOR 
THE TRIAL COURT' S RULING THAT SHE 
MADE A KNOWING AND VOLUNTARY 
WAIVER. 
The issue is not moot because if the trial court 
erred, this case will be remanded and there may be need for a 
trial. 
The best that can be said about the fourth point in 
1
 TSl's argument is that there is a question as to who carries the 
!burden of proof in this matter. There is no Utah authority on 
1
 the subject, and the authorities cited by the parties are 
[conflicting. Compare Leasing Service Corporation v. Crane, 804 
IF. 2d 828, 833 (4th Cir. 1986) with K. M. C. Company. Inc. v. 
; Irving Trust Company. 757 F. 2d 752, 758 (6th Cir. 1985). 
i However, the Court need not resolve this issue. TSl 
i 
i 
iconcedes that no matter who has the burden, the trial court's 
i 
i 
.ruling must be overturned if it has no "reasonable basis in the 
! 
evidence." (P. 37, Appellee's Brief) We must consider whether 
|the evidence in this regard was, as represented by TSl to be, 
" ample. " 
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On this issue, the tables are turned. TSl did not 
attempt to controvert any of the factual allegations in Allred' s 
Affidavit with an affidavit of its own. Rather, it rested on 
the erroneous legal proposition that knowledge of a jury trial 
waiver may be "presumed" by the signing of the contract. TSl 
has now recognized that this was error and attempts to fashion 
an evidentiary basis out of Allred's own Affidavit. (PP. 37-38) 
Allred may have been in business for four and a half 
years; may have been to college; and may have assumed a prior 
lease (though TSl does not tell us if it also had a jury trial 
waiver). But there is nothing to controvert the singularly 
decisive allegation that she did not know the lease agreement 
had a jury trial waiver. (R. 146, 11 6) If this were truly an 
issue for the "trier of fact," as TSl concedes (PP. 36-37), then 
the issue should have been "tried" on the merits and not by 
affidavit. 
In reality, there was no evidentiary basis for the 
trial court' s ruling. The trial court made no findings that 
would have supported the ruling. It is clear the trial court 
adopted TSl' s legal proposition and therefore erred as a matter 
of law. 
161X10157 
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IV. THERE IS NO REQUIREMENT THAT 
OBJECTIONS TO ATTORNEYS/ FEES 
REQUESTS BE IN THE FORM OF 
AFFIDAVIT, AND TS1 DOES NOT DENY 
THAT THE CERTIFICATION AND APPEAL 
WERE AT ITS INSTANCE. 
Rule 4-505, Utah Code of Judicial Administration, 
requires that requests for attorneys' fees be by affidavit. 
However, there is nothing in Utah law requiring that objections 
to those requests likewise be by affidavit. Quite to the 
contrary, this Court in LMV Leasing, Inc. v. Conlin, 805 P. 2d 
189 (Utah App. 1991) considered the objections of a party even 
when those objections were not in affidavit form. 805 P. 2d at 
198 (motion to strike). 
TS1 does not deny that the certification of its 
judgment and the appeal therefrom were instigated by TS1. TS1 
wanted to execute on its judgment, but could not do so unless it 
was "final." Rule 69(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. TS1 is 
the one who sought Rule 54(b) certification of the judgment. (R. 
296) Allred did not believe that Rule 54(b) certification was 
appropriate, but was more concerned at the time with execution 
on the judgment that TS1 had already started. (R. 276) When 
certification was made,4 Allred had no choice but to appeal. 
She fought the efforts of this Court to remit the case for lack 
4Allred did not "consent" to certification. She merely 
signed the certifications as "approved to form," which is not the 
same as saying that she agreed or consented to their entry. 
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of appellate jurisdiction because of the investment of time and 
money she had made in the appeal. 
But none of this answers the question asked by Allred. 
Why should she pay all of TSTs attorneys' fees for a certifi-
cation and appeal that TSl clearly wanted as much as she? TSl 
blithely ignores the fact that it also resisted this Court' s 
efforts to remit for lack of appellate jurisdiction. Each party 
should pay its own attorneys' fees for this fruitless appeal. 
As for the attempted execution on Allred' s supersedeas 
bond, TSl would have the Court ignore that it agreed to execute 
by motion—with notice to Allred. (R. 322) TSl tried to do it 
without motion and notice (R. 326), and Allred should not have 
to pay for TSl' s unlawful efforts in this regard. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing additional reasons, Allred asks this 
Court to reverse the trial court on its grant of summary 
judgment on TSl's complaint and Allred' s counterclaim, with a 
direction that there be a trial by jury, if trial is needed. In 
the alternative, Allred asks the Court to reduce the second 
award of attorneys' fees to $3,110.00. 
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Respectfully submitted this l < 5 ^ day of March, 1993. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
Donald L. Dalton 
Attorneys for Allred 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P. O. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
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